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Abstract
We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and
show that it, together with a weak form of payoff security, is enough to guarantee
the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games. We
show that our result generalizes the pure strategy existence theorem of Dasgupta
and Maskin [3] and that it is neither implied nor does it imply the existence the-
orems of Baye, Tian, and Zhou [2] and Reny [5]. Furthermore, we show that an
equilibrium may fail to exist when, while maintaining weak payoff security, weak
upper semicontinuity is weakened to reciprocal upper semicontinuity.
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1 Introduction
The existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave games relies on some weak
form of upper and lower semicontinuity. These two semicontinuity requirements can
be combined in one single condition, such as better-reply security ([5, Theorem 3.1])
or be imposed separately as weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity and payoff security,
respectively ([1, Proposition 1]). Also, as in [3, Corollary], they can take the form of
upper semicontinuity (i.e., each player’s payoff function is upper semicontinuous) and
weak payoff security (i.e., each player’s value function is lower semicontinuous).
Comparing the last two sets of conditions suggests that weakening the lower semicon-
tinuity requirement from payoff security to weak payoff security requires a strength-
ening of the upper semicontinuity one. We show that this is the case by presenting an
example of a game that, while satisfying weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity and
weak payoff security, fails to have a Nash equilibrium. In fact, the same conclusion
holds even if we require the sum of players’ payoff functions to be smooth.
Furthermore, we show that a considerably weaker condition than upper semicontinu-
ity suffices for the existence of Nash equilibria in weakly payoff-secure games. This
condition, which we name weak upper semicontinuity, strengthens the notion of weak
reciprocal upper semicontinuity of Bagh and Jofre [1]. This is accomplished by im-
posing a similar requirement as theirs, although not on the players’ payoff function
but rather on an extended payoff function that allows each player to deviate singly. 1
1 Formally, such a function is defined by u¯(x, y) = (u1(x1, y−1), . . . , un(xn, y−n)) for all
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Our existence result then states that a compact, quasiconcave game has a Nash equi-
librium provided that it is weakly upper semicontinuous and weakly payoff secure.
The above existence result is useful for games whose critical discontinuities are of
the lower, but not the upper, semicontinuity type. Indeed, we present examples of
games that satisfy the assumptions of our existence result but fail to have enough
lower semicontinuity to allow us to use either Theorem 3.1 in [5] or Theorem 1 in
[2]. Similarly, we also present examples of games that satisfy the assumptions of the
existence results of Reny and Baye, Tian and Zhou, but fail to have enough upper
semicontinuity to allow us to use our existence result.
Our existence result is obtained through a characterization of games that satisfy
both weak upper semicontinuity and weak payoff security. We show that a game
satisfies these conditions if and only if each player’s value function is continuous and
limit points of a player’s approximate best-replies, with the level of approximation
converging to zero, are themselves best-replies. This characterization clearly implies
that the (joint) best-reply correspondence has nonempty and compact values and a
closed graph, from which the existence of a Nash equilibrium can be derived using
standard arguments.
Although weak upper semicontinuity is a relatively weak condition, our characteriza-
tion also reveals that it becomes quite demanding when combined with weak payoff
security. In fact, it roughly requires that, when a player’s payoff function jumps down
x, y ∈∏ni=1Xi in a normal form game G = (Xi, ui)ni=1.
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at a strategy x, that player has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly higher than those
he would obtain in a neighborhood of x. However, unlike upper semicontinuity, weak
upper semicontinuity allows a player’s payoff function to jump down provided that
that player can compensate such a fall somewhere in his action space. This weaken-
ing of upper semicontinuity is analogous to that of reciprocal upper semicontinuity
obtained through weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity, since the latter allows all
players’ payoffs to jump down provided that some player can compensate such a fall
somewhere in his action space. Thus, our existence result is better regarded as a gen-
eralization of the existence result of Dasgupta and Maskin [3] in the same spirit of
the generalization of Reny’s Corollary 3.3 obtained by Bagh and Jofre [1].
2 Notation and Definitions
A normal form game G consists of a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n} and, for all
players i ∈ N , a metric space Xi of pure strategies and a payoff function ui : X → R,
where X =
∏
i∈N Xi.
We say that a game G is compact if, for all i ∈ N , Xi is compact and ui is bounded
(equivalently, ui(X) is contained in a compact subset of R). Given a player i ∈ N ,
the symbol −i denotes “all players but i”. Also, X−i = ∏j 6=iXj. Furthermore, we say
that G is quasiconcave if, for all i ∈ N , Xi is convex and ui(·, x−i) is quasiconcave for
all x−i ∈ X−i.
Let, for all i ∈ N , vi : X−i → R be defined by vi(x−i) = supxi∈Xi ui(xi, x−i); the
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function vi is player i’s value function. A game G is weakly payoff secure if vi is lower
semicontinuous for all i ∈ N . This assumption was introduced in [3] and is easily seen
to be equivalent to the following weak form of payoff security (hence its name): for
all i ∈ N , x ∈ X and ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 with the following property: for all
x′−i ∈ Bδ(x−i) there exists x¯i ∈ Xi such that ui(x¯i, x′−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i)− ε.
A game G is upper semicontinuous if ui is upper semicontinuous for all i ∈ N . A
weaker notion of upper semicontinuity is defined as follows. Define u¯ : X × X →
Rn by u¯(x, y) = (u1(x1, y−1), . . . , un(xn, y−n)) and let Γ = cl(graph(u¯)) \ graph(u¯)
denote the frontier of the graph of u¯. 2 A game G is weakly upper semicontinuous
if for all (x, y, u) ∈ Γ there exists i ∈ N and xˆi ∈ Xi such that ui(xˆi, y−i) > ui.
Proposition 3 below shows that, indeed, if G is upper semicontinuous, then G is
weakly reciprocally semicontinuous. This notion is inspired by and strengthens the
notion of weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity introduced by [1]. The function u¯ is
used in [5] and also in [2] under the form
∑
i∈N u¯i.
3 Existence of Nash Equilibria
In this section, we characterize games that satisfy both weak upper semicontinuity
and weak payoff security and use such characterization to derive our existence result
(Subsection 3.1). In Subsection 3.2, we show that our existence result strictly gener-
alizes the existence result of [3] and that it is formally unrelated to those of [5] and
2 For all subsets A of a topological space Y , cl(A) denotes the closure of A.
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[2]. 3 Finally, in Subsection 3.3, we present an example showing that reciprocal upper
semicontinuity together with weak payoff security are not enough to guarantee the
existence of Nash equilibria.
3.1 An Existence Result
The following result provides a characterization of weakly payoff secure and weakly
upper semicontinuous games.
Theorem 1 Let G be a compact game. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) G is weakly payoff secure and weakly upper semicontinuous.
(2) G is weakly payoff secure and for all i ∈ N and (x, α) ∈ cl(graph(ui))\graph(ui),
there exists xˆi ∈ Xi such that ui(xˆi, x−i) > α.
(3) For all i ∈ N , vi is continuous and the following property holds: if x ∈ X,
{xk}∞k=1 ⊆ X and {εk}∞k=1 ⊆ R+ are such that limk xk = x, limk εk = 0 and
ui(xk) ≥ vi(xk−i)− εk for all k ∈ N, then ui(x) = vi(x−i).
The equivalence between the first two conditions shows that, when combined with
weak payoff security, the requirement of weak upper semicontinuity becomes quite
demanding. An alternative way of seeing this is by defining a function uˆ : Xn → Rn
by uˆ(x1, . . . , xn) = (u1(x
1), . . . , un(x
n)) and noting that the second condition in 2
holds if and only if for all (x1, . . . , xn, u) ∈ cl(graph(uˆ)) \ graph(uˆ), there exists i ∈ N
3 Note that Theorem 2 of [3] is strictly weaker than their corollary. See the working paper
version of this paper for details.
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and xˆi ∈ Xi such that ui(xˆi, xi−i) > ui. Thus, the difference between weak reciprocal
upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity imposed alone and weak reciprocal
upper semicontinuity combined with weak payoff security is due to how the limit
payoff vector is computed: for weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity, this vector is
computed requiring all players to use the same strategy, whereas for weak upper
semicontinuity this requirement is relaxed by allowing each player to change her own
strategy; furthermore, when weak upper semicontinuity is combined with weak payoff
security, the limit payoff vector is computed allowing different players to use different
strategies.
The equivalence between the first and third conditions implies that, in compact,
weakly upper semicontinuous, weakly payoff-secure games, the best-reply correspon-
dence has nonempty and compact values and a closed graph. Furthermore, it also
has convex values whenever the game is quasiconcave. In this case, it follows from
[4] that the best-reply correspondence has a fixed point, and so the game has a Nash
equilibrium. In summary, Theorem 1 implies the following existence result. 4
Corollary 2 If G is compact, quasiconcave, weakly upper semicontinuous and weakly
payoff secure, then G has a Nash equilibrium.
We conclude this subsection with the proof of Theorem 1.
4 The equivalence between the first and third condition shows that, besides the continuity
of players’ value functions, weak upper semicontinuity and weak payoff security are almost
necessary for the best-reply property to have the standard fixed point theorem’s assump-
tions.
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Proof of Theorem 1. We start by establishing that 1 implies 2. Let i ∈ N and
(x, α) ∈ cl(graph(ui)) \ graph(ui). If ui(x) > α, simply let xˆi = xi; thus, we may
assume that ui(x) < α. Let {xk}∞k=1 be such that limk xk = x and limk ui(xk) = α.
For all k ∈ N, define zki = xki and, for all j 6= i, let zkj ∈ Xj be such that uj(zkj , xk−j) >
vj(x
k
−j) − 1/k. Since G is compact, we may assume that {zk}∞k=1 and {vj(xk−j)}∞k=1
converge for all j 6= i. Let z = limk zk and αj = limk vj(xk−j) for all j 6= i. Since
G is weakly payoff secure, then vj(x−j) ≤ αj and so uj(xˆj, x−j) ≤ αj for all j 6= i
and xˆj ∈ Xj. Hence, by weak upper semicontinuity, there exists xˆi ∈ Xi such that
ui(xˆi, x−i) > α.
We show next that 2 implies 3. Let i ∈ N , x−i ∈ X−i and {xk−i}∞k=1 be such that
limk x
k
−i = x−i. Let {vi(xm−i)}∞m=1 be a subsequence of {vi(xk−i)}∞k=1. For all m ∈ N,
let xmi ∈ Xi be such that ui(xmi , xm−i) > vi(xm−i) − 1/m. Since G is compact, then
there is a subsequence {vi(xn−i)}∞n=1 of {vi(xm−i)}∞m=1 and a subsequence {xni }∞n=1 of
{xmi }∞m=1 such that both converge. By construction, limn ui(xn) = limn vi(xn−i) and
so (x, limn vi(x
n
−i)) ∈ cl(graph(ui)). Since ui(x) ≤ vi(x−i) ≤ limn vi(xn−i), it follows
by 2 that ui(x) = limn vi(x
n
−i) and so vi(x−i) = limn vi(x
n
−i). Since every subsequence
of {vi(xk−i)}∞k=1 has a further subsequence converging to vi(x−i), we conclude that
vi(x−i) = limk vi(xk−i) and that vi is continuous.
In order to establish the second condition in 3, consider x ∈ X, {xk}∞k=1 ⊆ X and
{εk}∞k=1 ⊆ R+ such that limk xk = x, limk εk = 0 and ui(xk) ≥ vi(xk−i) − εk for all
k ∈ N. Then, limk ui(xk) = limk vi(xk−i) = vi(x−i). Thus, (x, vi(x−i)) ∈ cl(graph(ui))
and so ui(x) = vi(x−i).
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We finally establish that 3 implies 1. Since vi is continuous for all i ∈ N , then G is
weakly payoff secure. In order to see that G is weakly upper semicontinuous, con-
sider (x, y, u) ∈ Γ and let {(xk, yk)}∞k=1 be such that (x, y) = limk(xk, yk) and u =
limk u¯(xk, yk). If ui = vi(y−i) for all i ∈ N , then, letting εki = vi(yk−i)− ui(xki , yk−i) ≥ 0
and εk = maxi ε
i
k for all k ∈ N and i ∈ N , we obtain ui(xki , yk−i) ≥ vi(yk−i) − εk,
limk ε
i
k = vi(y−i) − ui = 0 for all i ∈ N and so limk εk = 0. It then follows by 3
that u¯i(x, y) = ui(xi, y−i) = vi(y−i) = ui and so (x, y, u) ∈ graph(u¯), a contradiction.
Hence, there exists i ∈ N such that ui 6= vi(y−i). Since ui = limk ui(xki , yk−i) ≤
limk vi(y
k
−i) = vi(y−i), then ui < vi(y−i) and so there exists xˆi ∈ Xi such that
ui(xˆi, y−i) > ui. Therefore, G is weakly upper semicontinuous.
3.2 Examples and Related Literature
Most of the examples we consider belong to the following class of diagonal games.
These are two-player games on the unit square with the following payoff functions:
ui(x) =

φi(x) if xi = x−i,
fi(x) if xi 6= x−i,
where φi, fi : [0, 1]
2 → R are continuous.
Clearly, a diagonal game G is compact. Suppose, in addition, that G is also quasi-
concave and satisfies the following condition: for all i ∈ {1, 2} and x−i ∈ [0, 1], either
φi(x−i, x−i) = vi(x−i) or there exists xˆi ∈ [0, 1] such that fi(xˆi, x−i) > fi(x−i, x−i).
10
When a diagonal game satisfies these two assumptions, one can show that it satisfies
the conditions of Corollary 2 and so that it has a Nash equilibrium.
In fact, weak payoff security follows because
vi(x−i) = max{φi(x−i, x−i), max
xi∈[0,1]
fi(xi, x−i)}
for all i ∈ {1, 2} and x−i ∈ [0, 1] and so vi is continuous. Note that the above
equality clearly holds when φi(x−i, x−i) ≥ maxxi∈[0,1] fi(xi, x−i). When φi(x−i, x−i) <
maxxi∈[0,1] fi(xi, x−i), then maxxi∈[0,1] fi(xi, x−i) > fi(x−i, x−i). This conclusion fol-
lows since otherwise we obtain that φi(x−i, x−i) < fi(x−i, x−i) and so φi(x−i, x−i) <
fi(x
′
i, x−i) for some x
′
i sufficiently close to x−i. Hence, vi(x−i) > φi(x−i, x−i) and
so fi(xˆi, x−i) > fi(x−i, x−i) = maxxi fi(xi, x−i) for some xˆi 6= x−i, a contradiction.
Clearly, maxxi∈[0,1] fi(xi, x−i) > max{fi(x−i, x−i), φi(x−i, x−i)} implies that vi(x−i) =
maxxi∈[0,1] fi(xi, x−i).
In order to establish the weak upper semicontinuity of G, let (x, y, u) ∈ Γ and consider
a sequence {(xk, yk)}∞k=1 converging to (x, y) such that {u¯(xk, yk)}∞k=1 converges to u.
We may assume that ui(xi, y−i) < ui for some i, since otherwise there is nothing to
prove. It is clear that ui = ui(xi, y−i) if either xi 6= y−i, or if xi = y−i and there exists a
subsequence {(xmi , ym−i)}∞m=1 of {(xki , yk−i)}∞k=1 such that xmi = ym−i for all j. Hence, xi =
y−i and xki 6= yk−i for all k sufficiently large. Therefore, fi(y−i, y−i) = ui > ui(xi, y−i) =
φi(y−i, y−i). The continuity of fi implies that vi(y−i) ≥ fi(x′i, y−i) > φi(y−i, y−i) for
some x′i 6= y−i and so there exists xˆi 6= y−i such that ui(xˆi, y−i) > fi(y−i, y−i) = ui,
establishing the desired conclusion.
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While a quasiconcave, diagonal game satisfying the above conditions always satisfies
the assumptions of Corollary 2, it may fail to satisfy better-reply security. When this
is the case, Reny’s theorem cannot be applied.
The following example illustrates that a quasiconcave, diagonal game may fail to
be better-reply secure. Consider two friends who have to catch a train at 9am and
want to meet sometime between 8 and 9am. While one of them is very strict on
punctuality, the other likes to be 5 minutes late. Formally, let [0, 1] represent a time
between 8 and 9am, ε > 0 represent a delay of 5 minutes and player 1 represent the
punctual friend. Assume that G is quasiconcave, φ1(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]2, f1 ≡ 0,
u2(x1, x1+ε) > u2(x1, x2) for all x1 < 1−ε and x2 6= x1+ε and u2(x1, 1) > u2(x1, x2)
for all x1 ≥ 1 − ε and x2 6= 1. 5 Then, it follows from Theorem 2 and the above
analysis that this game as a Nash equilibrium. 6 In fact, this game has a unique Nash
equilibrium x1 = x2 = 1, i.e., players meet only when the train is about to leave.
However, this game is not better-reply secure. To see this, simply consider x = (0, ε)
and u = (0, f2(0, ε)). Clearly, (x, u) ∈ graph(u), x is not a Nash equilibrium, player 2
cannot obtain a payoff strictly above u2, and player 1, while able to obtain a payoff
strictly above 0, cannot secure it. Hence, Reny’s Theorem cannot be applied to this
game.
5 For example, let u2(x) = (1− x1 + x2)/(1 + ε) if x2 ≤ x1 + ε and u2(x) = (1 + 2ε+ x1 −
x2)/(1 + ε) otherwise.
6 The quasiconcavity of u2(x1, ·) implies that maxx2 f2(x1, x2) > f2(x1, x1) whenever
v2(x1) > φ2(x1, x1).
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The above example also shows that Corollary 2 is not implied by Theorem 1 of
[2]. Assume further that φ1(x) ≥ 2 and |f2(x)|, |φ2(x)| ≤ 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1]2. Let
x = (0, ε), y = (0, 0) and U(s, t) = u¯1(s, t) + u¯2(s, t) for all s, t ∈ [0, 1]2. Then,
U(x, y) = φ1(0, 0) + f2(0, ε) > φ1(0, 0) + φ2(0, 0) = U(y, y). However, for all x
′ ∈ X
and δ > 0, there exists z ∈ Bδ(y) such that U(x′, z) ≤ U(z, z). In fact, letting
z ∈ Bδ(y) be such that z2 6= x′1 and z2 = z1, we obtain that U(z, z) − U(x′, z) =
φ1(z) + φ2(z) − u2(z1, x′2) ≥ 0 since u2(z1, x′2) − φ2(z) ≤ 2 ≤ φ1(z). Thus, this game
is not diagonally transfer continuous and so Theorem 1 of [2] does not apply.
Also, this example illustrates that Corollary 2 is more permissive than the corollary
in [3]. In fact, if f1(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]2, then Corollary 2 implies that the above
game has a Nash equilibrium for all functions f1. In particular, this is so even when
f1 is not upper semicontinuous, a case in which their result cannot be applied.
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Proposition 3 below states that weak upper semicontinuity is indeed a weakening of
upper semicontinuity. Together with Corollary 2, it implies that all upper semicon-
tinuous and weakly payoff-secure games have a Nash equilibrium. Hence, Corollary 2
generalizes the corollary in [3].
Proposition 3 If G is upper semicontinuous, then G is weakly upper semicontinuous.
Proof. Let (x, y, u) ∈ Γ and i ∈ N be such that ui(xi, y−i) 6= ui. Let {(xk, yk)}∞k=1
be such that (x, y) = limk(xk, yk) and u = limk u¯(xk, yk). Then, for all i ∈ N , ui =
7 Letting φ2 = f2 and f1 be upper semicontinuous, we obtain an example of a game that
satisfies the assumptions of the corollary in [3] but not those of Theorem 3.1 in [5].
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limk ui(x
k
i , y
k
−i) and, since player i’s payoff function is upper semicontinuous, we obtain
that ui(xi, y−i) ≥ ui. This inequality combined with ui(xi, y−i) 6= ui implies that
ui(xi, y−i) > ui. Hence, simply let xˆi = xi.
Although Corollary 2 implies the corollary in Dasgupta and Maskin [3], the same does
not hold regarding either Reny’s or Baye, Tian and Zhou’s existence results.
The following example shows that Corollary 2 does not imply Reny’s existence the-
orem. Let G be described by N = {1, 2}, X1 = X2 = [0, 1], u1 : X → R be defined
by
u1(x1, x2) =

1 if x1 ≤ 1/2,
0 otherwise,
and u2 : X → R be defined by u2(x1, x2) = 1−u1(x1, x2). It is clear that G is compact,
quasiconcave and reciprocally upper semicontinuous (the last property follows because
u1+u2 ≡ 1, hence continuous). The game G is also payoff secure. This follows because
u2 is lower semicontinuous (see [5, Corollary 3.4]) and u1(0, x
′
2) > u1(x) − ε for all
ε > 0, x ∈ X and x′2 ∈ X2. Thus, we can apply Reny’s theorem to this game. However,
G does not satisfy weak upper semicontinuity: Letting x = y = (1/2, 0) and u = (1, 1),
we see that (x, y, u) ∈ Γ (simply take xk = (1/2, 0) and yk = (1/2(1 + 1/k), 0) for all
k ∈ N), but for all i ∈ N and all xˆi ∈ Xi, ui(xˆi, y−i) ≤ 1 = ui.
Furthermore, the above example also shows that Corollary 2 does not imply Baye,
Tian and Zhou’s Theorem. Recall that this game is not weakly upper semicontinuous
and so Corollary 2 does not apply. However, it is both diagonally transfer continuous
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and diagonally transfer quasiconcave, implying that Baye, Tian and Zhou’s Theorem
can be used to conclude that it has a Nash equilibrium. Let (x, y) ∈ X ×X be such
that U(x, y) > U(y, y). Since U(y, y) = u1(y) + u2(y) = 1 for all y ∈ X, it follows
that U(x, y) = 2 and u1(x1, y2) = u2(y1, x2) = 1. Thus, x1 ≤ 1/2 and y1 > 1/2. Let
δ > 0 be such that δ < y1− 1/2 and x′ = x. Then, U(x′, z) = u1(x1, z2)+u2(z1, x2) =
2 > 1 = U(z, z) for all z ∈ Bδ(y). Thus, the game is diagonally transfer continuous.
Finally, we establish diagonal transfer quasiconcavity. Let Xm = {x1, . . . , xm} and
define yk = (0, 0) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m and Y m = {y1, . . . , ym}. Then, for any subset
{yk1 , . . . , yks} of Y m, with 1 ≤ s ≤ m, if yk0 ∈ co({yk1 , . . . , yks}), then yk0 = (0, 0)
and so, for all xkj , 1 ≤ j ≤ s, U(xkj , yk0) = u1(xkj1 , 0) + u2(0, xkj2 ) = u1(xkj1 , 0) ≤ 1 =
U(yk0 , yk0). Hence, the game is diagonally transfer quasiconcave.
3.3 Weakening Weak Upper Semicontinuity
Corollary 2, together with [5, Theorem 3.1] and [1, Proposition 1], implies that there
are two sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in compact,
quasiconcave games. These conditions are easily comparable since our conditions
strengthen the upper semicontinuity requirement while they weaken the lower semi-
continuity one.
In this section we consider the effect of combining the weakest forms of both upper
and lower semicontinuity, i.e., weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity and weak payoff
security. Proposition 4 shows that these two conditions are enough to guarantee that
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the set of Nash equilibria is closed and that the limit points of a sequence of ε –
equilibria, with ε converging to zero, are Nash equilibria. 8
Proposition 4 Suppose that G is compact, weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous
and weakly payoff secure. Then, the set of Nash equilibria is closed, and if {xk}∞k=1 is
a converging sequence of εk – equilibria, with {εk}∞k=0 ⊆ R+ converging to zero, then
x = limk xk is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. Note that the first statement follows from the second by taking εk = 0 for all
k ∈ N. In order to establish the second statement, let {εk}∞k=1 ⊆ R+ converge to zero,
{xk}∞k=1 ⊆ X be a converging sequence such that xk is an εk – equilibrium, for all k ∈
N, and let x = limk xk. Since u is bounded, we may assume that {u(xk)}∞k=1 converges.
Let u = limk u(xk) and since ui(xk)+εk ≥ vi(xk−i) ≥ ui(xk) for all i ∈ N and k ∈ N, we
obtain that u = limk v(xk). By weak payoff security, vi is lower semicontinuous and so
vi(x−i) ≤ ui for all i ∈ N . If (x, u) ∈ cl(graph(u))\graph(u), then, by weak reciprocal
upper semicontinuity, there exists i ∈ N and xˆi ∈ Xi such that ui(xˆi, x−i) > ui and
so vi(x−i) ≥ ui(xˆi, x−i) > ui, a contradiction. Hence, (x, u) ∈ graph(u), implying that
vi(x−i) ≤ ui = ui(x) for all i ∈ N . Hence, ui(x) = vi(x−i) for all i ∈ N and so x is a
Nash equilibrium of G.
8 See [5, Remark 3.1] for the case of better-reply secure games. When the game is recipro-
cally upper semicontinuous and weakly payoff secure, the conclusion that the set of Nash
equilibria is closed follows also from Theorem 1 in R. Gatti “A Note on the Existence of
Nash Equilibrium in Games with Discontinuous Payoffs, and an Application to First-Price
Auctions”, University of Cambridge, 2005.
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The following example shows that weak lower semicontinuity and the smoothness of
the sum of players’ payoff functions (and, hence, weak reciprocal upper semicontinu-
ity) are not enough to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Let G be a two-player game with X1 = X2 = [0, 1]. Let f : X → R be defined by
f(x) = 1− (x1 − x2)2, A = {x ∈ X : x1 ≥ x2}, B = {x ∈ X : x1 < x2}, C = {(1, 0)}
and, for every subset D of X, χD denote the characteristic function of D. Define
u1(x) = f(x)χA(x)− χC(x) and u2(x) = f(x)χB(x) + χC(x) for all x ∈ X. Thus,
u1(x) =

−1 if x = (1, 0),
1− (x1 − x2)2 if x1 ≥ x2 and x 6= (1, 0),
0 otherwise,
and
u2(x) =

1 if x = (1, 0),
1− (x1 − x2)2 if x1 < x2,
0 otherwise.
Note that G is compact and quasiconcave. Moreover, the sum of players’ payoff func-
tions, u1 + u2, is equal to f and therefore smooth. Furthermore, v1(x2) = v2(x1) = 1
for all x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1] and so G is weakly payoff secure. However, G has no Nash equi-
librium. In fact, the graph of player 1’s best-reply correspondence is the diagonal of
X, whereas that of player 2 equals C = {(1, 0)}, and so they do not intersect.
17
References
[1] Bagh, A., and A. Jofre (2006): “Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better
Reply Secure Games: A Comment,” Econometrica, 74, 1715–1721.
[2] Baye, M., G. Tian, and J. Zhou (1993): “Characterizations of the Existence
of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave Payoffs,” Rev.
Econ. Stud., 60, 935–948.
[3] Dasgupta, P., and E. Maskin (1986): “The Existence of Equilibrium in Dis-
continuous Economic Games, I: Theory,” Rev. Econ. Stud., 53, 1–26.
[4] Glicksberg, I. (1952): “A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point
Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points,” Proc. Amer. Math. Soc.,
3, 170–174.
[5] Reny, P. (1999): “On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Equilibria in
Discontinuous Games,” Econometrica, 67, 1029–1056.
18
